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foregoing evidence reasonable minds conld it is manifest 
that the trial conrt 's conclusion is supportable from the evi-
dence and the facts found. Accordingly, if we follow the 
rules hereinabove stated, the judgment should be affirmed. 
Shenk, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 24410. In Bank. Feb. 21, 1958.] 
Estate of NEI.JLIE NEUBAUER, Deceased. HAZEL HURST 
FOUNDATION et al., Appellants, v. CHARLES 
EAMES et al., Respondents. 
[1] Wills-Revocation and Alteration.-The question of revocation 
by cancellation or obliteration of the whole or a part of a 
will must be presented and decided either when the will is 
offered for probate or by a proceeding or contest brought 
within the time required by law. (Prob. Code, § 380.) 
[2] Decedents' Estates-Nature of Administration Proceedings.-
An adjudication as to each step in a series of different pro-
ceedings, contemplated in the administration of estates of 
deceased persons, is final in nature, not subject to review in a 
subsequent stage of administration. 
[3] Wills-Probate-Collateral Attack.-Although an order ad-
mitting a will to probate may be appealed from or the admis-
sion to probate may be contested and the validity of the will 
attacked within the time required by law, an attack on the 
order or a contest of the validity of the whole or a part of 
the will is not a direct attack merely because made or insti-
tuted in some proceeding connected with the administration 
of the estate. 
[4] Id.-Probate-Natnre of Proceedings: Effect of Probate.-A 
proceeding for probate of a will is in rem, instituted for the 
purpose of establishing the status of a written instrument, 
and a judgment admitting the instrument to probate is binding 
[1] Effect of testator's attempted physical alteration of will 
after execution, note, 24 A.L.R.2d 514. See also Cal.Jur., Wills, 
§ 135; Am.Jur., Wills, § 493. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 18; Am.Jur., 
Executors and Administrators, § 23. 
[4] See Cal.Jur., Wills,§§ 326, 339; Am.Jur., §§ 745,935. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, § 246; [2] Decedents' Estates, 
§15; [3] Wills, §479; [4] Wills, §§440, 475; [5] Decedents' Es-
tates, § 984; [ 6] Wills, §§ 475, 478. 
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interested in the will who, constructively 
to appear at the probate, might have come in, and 
who, had they come in, would have been heard for or against 
its validity. 
Decedents' Estates - Heirship Proceedings - Jurisdiction.-
Proceedings to determine heirship (Prob. Code, § 1080) are 
and distinct from those to admit a will to probate, 
and in a to determine heirship the court has power 
only to interpret the will that has been admitted to probate 
and cannot again pass on questions of due execution or validity 
of the will. 
[6] Wills-Probate-Conclusiveness: Collateral Attack.-Where a 
will as executed was admitted to probate with the exception 
of a bequest which was held to have been revoked by an holo-
graphic codicil, and where the time for appeal and contest 
had elapsed, the question of what constituted the will of 
decedent should be considered as res judicata, and on a 
collateral attack, such as an heirship proceeding, the court was 
limited to an interpretation of the terms of the will as ad-
mitted to probate. 
APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County determining heirship. Burdette J. Daniels, 
Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Edward Raiden for Appellant Hazel Hurst Foundation. 
Harold L. Green for .Appellant Sweeney. 
Watkins & Charlton for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Two appeals from an order determining 
heirship and the judgment entered thereon are here involved 
and will be considered separately insofar as practicable. 
There is no dispute concerning the facts. Nellie Neubauer 
executed a formal will on September 9, 1954. Her attorney 
retained the original and at her own request l\Irs. Neubauer 
executed a duplicate whick she retained in her possession. 
The will, which consisted of four pages, contained certain 
specific bequests which are not involved here. In the will 
Mrs. Neubauer directed her executor to pay to her husband 
the sum of $250 per month during his lifetime. On pages 
2 and 3 of the will Mrs. Neubauer directed that "(b) Upon 
the death of my said husband (or upon my death in the event 
my said husband does not survive me), then I direct that 
the rest and residue of my estate shall be distributed for 
genera.! charitable purposes as follows : 40 per cent thereof to 
fornia ; 40 per cent thereof to the 
Los California; 20 per cent thereof Hazel 
California. I shall have 
[sic] the recipient charities commemorate my by placing 
or scroll or whatever device that organi-
uses the memory of those who 
amount similar to my With the 
the to 
and the invalidation thereof under Pro-
bate Code, Section or any and all other similar 
of the law, I declare that I desire to take advantage of the 
doctrine set forth in Estate of 74 357 [168 
P.2d 789], and Estate of Haines, 76 Cal.App.2d 673 [173 P.2d 
693], as follows: In the event that any gift, legacy or devise 
to a charity or charitable organization, be held invalid in 
whole or in part, then I hereby substitute for such charity as 
such legatee or devisee my trusted FLoRENCE SwEENEY 
of Detroit, Michigan; or if she is deceased, the State of 
California.'' 
Paragraph "Eighth" provided that "Having in mind my 
nieces and nephew and all other heirs and next of kin, I 
have intentionally omitted to give, bequeath or devise any of 
my property to my said heirs or next of kin, knowing that 
adequate provision has otherwise been made for each of them.'' 
The will also contained a no contest clause. 
J\irs. Neubauer died on December 31, 1954, more than three 
months and less than six months after the execution of the 
will on September 9, 1954. 
Without the knowledge of Mrs. Neubauer's attorney, Mrs. 
Neubauer altered the executed duplicate of the original will 
as follows: On page 2 of the duplicate the following bequest 
" ( 4) The sum of $1,000, I give to GRACE RIDLEY of Detroit, 
Michigan" had a single line drawn through it in ink and the 
following notation in testatrix' handwriting was made in the 
space following it: ''I changed my mind about this-signed-
Sept -9-54. Nellie Neubauer." 
On page 3 provision (b) of the will as hereinbefore set forth 
had been altered as follows: The 20 per cent bequest to the 
Hazel Hurst Foundation had parentheses drawn around it 
and had been heavily overlined. Just above the overlining 
appeared the testatrix' signature. There was, however, no 
date appearing thereon. After the citation of the cases of 
Estate of Davis and Estate of Haines and following the words 
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"as follows ' these marks: ' the event that any 
or devise to a or charitable ""'""'z.n. 
be held invalid in whole or then I 
for such --~-·----'----:::--:::--:-~ 
FLORENCE ;..l\Xnnc>.Tti'v 
written. 
The 'l'hat on or about Sep-
tember 9, after of said said 
testatrix drew a line (d) or Paragraph 
Fifth of said will and inserted a that is entirely 
dated and the hand of the testatrix her-
self." and that the will be admitted to probate. In 
the petition for probate no mention was made of the lining 
over of the to the Hazel Hurst Foundation. Both the 
altered duplicate and the original and unaltered will were 
attached to the petition for probate. While the record does 
not show which one was admitted to probate it is, appar-
ently, admitted the parties that it was the altered duplicate. 
The Hazel Hurst Foundation received a notice of intention 
to probate the will but did not appear on February 7, 1955, 
when the court heard the petition. On August 10, 1955, more 
than six months after the making of the above order, the 
executor petitioned the court for a determination of heirship. 
Notice of was given the Hazel Hurst Foundation. 
After the on the heirship proceeding, the court made 
findings of fact and conclusions of law wherein it was found 
that it was the " altered will that had been ad-
mitted to probate and that at the time of admission the court 
had stated'' The will is admitted in its present form; petitioner 
appointed; bond is waived. The reason for that is that it 
bears a date and the signature and it is tantamount to an 
holographic codicil." It was also found that paragraph 
"SEVENTH: (b) ... '20% thereof to the Hazel Hurst Founda-
tion, Azusa, California' have been eliminated from the will." 
The record does not show that any such findings were made on 
the probate of the will. 'l'he trial court in the heirship 
proceeding concluded that the testatrix died intestate as to 
20 per cent of the balance after the termination of 
the trust in favor of testatrix' surviving husband "the amount 
to the Hazel Hurst Foundation. California having been 
eliminated from the will, but said amount does not become a 
part of the residue to be distributed to any charity or chari-
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table corporation under Paragraph Seventh (b). The Charita-
ble bequest to the Hazel Hurst Foundation is not held invalid 
in whole or in part so as to be distributable to Florence 
Sweeney or the State of California, but has merely been 
stricken from the will as part of the holographic codicil here-
tofore adjudicated [the $1,000 bequest to Grace Ridley], and 
is to be held in trust in the manner provided in Paragraph 
Seventh (a) for the benefit of James H. Neubauer for so long 
as he shall live, and then distributed to the persons entitled 
thereto under the laws of succession as set out in Chapter II, 
Division II of the Probate Code." 
Both the Hazel Hurst Foundation and Florence Sweeney 
appeal from the judgment entered upon the above conclusion. 
The foundation argues that the order admitting the will 
to probate conclusively established that the gift in its behalf 
had not been revoked inasmuch as the probate of the will 
had not been contested, no appeal taken from the order and 
no contest made within the statutory period (Prob. Code, 
§ 380). The foundation relies on Estate of Parsons, 196 Cal. 
294, 298, 299, 300 [237 P. 744], where the will sought to be 
admitted to probate showed a number of erasures and inter-
lineations attested by the initials of the decedent. Some of 
the lines and marks were not attested or noted in any way 
and, according to the court, did not obliterate or render 
illegible or uncertain the plain provisions of the will. There 
was no objection or contest of any kind and the court executed 
the certificate required by law and annexed the original will 
thereto. The order admitting the will to probate was not 
appealed from and there was no contest thereof within the 
time required by law. Upon a petition for partial distribution 
the appellants there (those in whose favor the interlined 
bequests had been made) were denied distribution. [1] This 
court there said: ''In seeking a reversal of the order denying 
their petition for partial distribution, appellants invoke the 
application of sections 1327 and 1333 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, which provide that when a will has been admitted 
to probate, and no person, within one year after the probate, 
contests the same or the validity of the will, the probate of 
the instrument is conclusive (except as to those under certain 
disabilities). They do not question the rule that a portion 
of a will may be revoked by cancellation or obliteration, with 
the intent and for the purpose of revoking the same, by the 
testator himself, or by some person in his presence and by his 
direction (Civ. Code, § 1292), but contend that the question 
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of revocation or obliteration of the whole or 
of a of must be and decided either when 
the will is offered for a or contest 
within one year after the will is admitted. The con-
tention of the must be The probate 
in the administration of 
the estates of deceased persons a of different proceed-
each of which is to the matters embraced 
within its An as to each step in this 
be final in its and not subject 
to review in a of the administration of the 
estate. [3] An order a will may be appealed 
or the admission of the instrument to may be 
contested, and the of the will attacked within one 
year after such probate, but an attack on the order, or a 
contest of the of the whole or of a part of the will, 
is not a direct attack because made or instituted in 
some connected with the administration of the 
same estate. (Estate of 151 CaL 318, 323 [121 Am.St. 
Rep. 105, 86 P. 183, 90 P. 711].) [4] The proceeding for 
the probate of the will is one in rem, instituted for the pur-
pose of establishing the status of written instrument. (Estate 
of Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 585 [150 P. 989].) The judgment 
admitting the instrument to probate is therefore binding upon 
all persons interested in the will who, being constructively 
notified to appear at the probate, might have come in, and 
who, had they come in, would have been heard for or against 
its validity. (Estate of Allen, 176 Cal. 632, 633 [169 P. 
364] .) " It was held that the attack aimed at the will of 
the decedent Parsons by the respondent executor in response 
to a petition for partial distribution filed more than one year 
after the will was admitted to probate was "an independent 
and wholly distinct proceeding from that for the probate of 
the document. It is, therefore, a collateral and not a direct 
attack. (Esta.te of Davis, supra.)" It was concluded that 
''the lower court was in error in denying the petition of the 
appellants for partial distribution on the ground that the 
provisions of the will making the bequests for them had been 
revoked.'' 
It should be borne in mind that the words of the admitting 
court quoted by the court in the heirship proceeding could 
oniy have referred to the bequest to Grace Ridley which had 
been dated as well as signed when stricken out by the testatrix 
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on the that she had 
"about this." The of 20 per cent of her estate to 
the Hazel Hurst Foundation had been heavily lined over and 
the testatrix' signature placed above the lining over without 
any date. It also appears in one of the briefs that while the 
Grace bequest was revoked in the one to the 
foundation was lined over in 
The foundation also relies on the statement made in Estate 
Plaut, 27 Cal.2d 424 [16,:1: P.2d 765, 162 A.L.R. 837], 
wherein it was said (p. 427): "Upon the contest of a will, 
whether before or after probate, the court will ordinarily not 
construe the instrument. (Estate of Oook, 173 Cal. 465, 468 
[160 P. 553]; Estate of Fay, 145 Cal. 82, 87 [78 P. 340, 104 
Am.St.Rep. 17j; Estate of Pforr, 144 Cal. 121, 125 [77 P. 
825] ; Estate of Murphy, 104 Cal. 554, 566 138 P. 543] ; Estate 
of Oobb, 49 Cal. 599, 604; see 2 Woerner, Administration, 3d 
ed., 77 4.) The only issue before the court is whether the 
instrument contested is or is not the will of the testator, and 
the power to construe will be exercised only insofar as it is 
necessary to the determination of that issue. (See Estate of 
Murphy, supra, and cases cited in 2 Page on Wills, 3d ed., 
§ 639.)" In Estate of Brodersen, 102 Cal.App.2d 896, 906 
[229 P.2d 38], the court emphasized that it is not the function 
of the trial court to construe a will in the proceeding brought 
for admission of the will for probate. The court in the Broder-
sen case disrussed the Estate of Parsons and noted that in 
that case, ''The question before the probate court was whether 
parts of the document which was presented to the court as 
a will had been manually deleted, so that not the whole 
instrument, but the parts not deleted, constituted the will 
of the testator. Since it was not found that portions of the 
will had been deleted, the will was as originally 
written and executed, and the order of the court to that effect 
was held to be res judicata." It was concluded that 
the facts of the Brodersen case did not bring it within the 
rule of Estate of Parsons. In other words, the foundation 
argues in effect that it was never before the court and that 
no construction of the validity of the bequest to it had been 
made. It will be recalled that the petition for probate con-
cerned itself only with the revoked bequest to Grace Ridley 
and made no mention of the fact that the bequest to the 
foundation had been lined over with the testatrix' signature 
interlined above the lining over. From a practical point of 
view under the circumstances appearing in the case at bar it 
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appears that there was no reason for the foundation to insti-
tute any kind of contest concerning the existence or validity 
of the to it. 
It appears that the rule set forth in Estate of Parsons, 196 
Cal. 294 [237 P. 744], hereinbefore set forth, is controlling 
inasmuch as the will was admitted to probate ''in its present 
form" which was as it had been executed by the testatrix 
with the of the holographic codicil revoking the 
$1,000 bequest to Grace Ridley. [5] In Estate of Caruch, 
139 Cal..App.2d 178, 187 [293 P.2d 514], the court, after 
discussing Estate of Parsons, supra, said: "Under these cases 
the due execution and validity of the will are determined at 
the time the will is admitted to probate. If no contest is filed 
within the time set forth in section 384 of the Probate Code, 
those determinations are final and conclusive. The proceedings 
under section 1080 of the Probate Code are separate and 
distinct from those to admit the will to probate. In such a 
proceeding due execution and validity of the will cannot be 
collaterally attacked. All that the court has powe1· to do in 
such a proceeding is to interpret the will that has been 
admitted to probate-it cannot again pass on the questions of 
d1te execution or validity. This was the precise holding in 
Estate of Salmonski, 38 Cal.2d 199, 207 [288 P.2d 966] : 
' [Wl hat documents go to make up a will must necessarily be 
determined in the first instance on application for probate; 
and determinations so made have the effect of judgments and 
become conclusive in the course of time .... 
" '[I]t is clear here that in the absence of an appeal, the 
order admitting the two documents to probate after contest 
now stands as a conclusive adjudication of their status as a 
will and a codicil thereto; but beyond consideration for the 
determination of that precise issue of what documents consti-
tuted the deceased's last will, questions of construction and 
interpretation in measure of the effect of the two documents 
one on the other were ''appropriate matters for consideration 
and determination" in the instant heirship proceeding.' 
(See also Estate of Sar·gavak, 41 Cal.2d 314 [259 P.2d 897} ; 
E>date of Challman, 127 Cal..App.2d 736 (274 P.2d 489] .) " 
<Emphasis added.) 
[6] .As applied to the facts of the case at bar, the applica-
tion of the rule of Estate of Parsons, supra, leads to this 
result: The will as executed was admitted to probate with the 
exception of the bequest to Grace Ridley which was held to 
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Insofar as 
will be recalled 
event the 
[49 0.2d 
The time for 
""'"".,.'"" of what con-
must be considered as 
such as the pro-
limited to an interpreta-
the wiU as admitted 
s "'""" "" is 
substitutional in 
failed in whole or in part. 
the proceeding Under the trial 
that the share the Hurst Foundation had "been eliminated 
from the will'' and that it went intestate succession rather 
than to Florence as substitutional legatee, the 
is concerned with that question. 
In view of the conclusion which must be reached here 
because of the rule set forth in Estate of Parsons, supra, the 
order as it affects Florence Sweeney is 
that order was based on erroneous 
reasoning, and the order as it relates to the interest of the 
Hazel Hurst Foundation is reversed. 
Gibson, 0. Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and Draper, J. pro tern.,• concurred. 
The petition of 
denied March 1958. 
therein in place 
for a rehearing was 
pro tern.,• participated 
*Assigned by Chai.nnan of J udieiai. Council. 
